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Abstract: This paper aims to explore the issue of modernity in Chinese philosophy in the 
early 20th century. The case study focuses on modern scholar Wang Guowei 王國維 
(1877-1927)’s criticism of his contemporary Gu Hongming 辜鴻銘  (1857-1928)’s 
English translation of the classical Confucian text Zhongyong. I argue that Wang Guowei 
and Gu Hongming’s case in fact demonstrates two alternative approaches towards 
philosophical dialogue and cultural exchange. Wang’s approach is a very cultural 
context-sensitive one: understanding the differences and selecting what is needed for 
cultural inspiration and reformation—we could call this approach nalaizhuyi拿來主義 
(taking-inism)—borrowing without touching the cultural essence. Gu’s approach is more 
a songchuzhuyi 送出主義 (sending-outism). It is a global-local context sensitive one: 
searching for the local’s path towards the global. Reevaluating Gu’s not very exact 
cultural translation can provide an opportunity to look beyond the “modernization 
complex,” deconstruct westernization “spell,” and build a new internationalism. I further 
argue that Gu’s case represents a kind of risky songchuzhuyi and a false internationalism 
which makes the native culture speak in the other’s terms while Wang’s cultural stand and 
his “journey” back to his own cultural sensibility sticks to its own terms and discovers the 
value of the culture. I then further look at Wang Guowei’s ideal of shenshengzhuyi生生主
義 (live-life-ism) which was originally expressed in his Hongloumeng Pinglun 《红楼梦
评论》(Critique of A Dream of Red Mansions, 1904) and claim that not only can the ideal 
of shengshengzhuyi explain the underlying reason for an essential turn in Wang’s 
academic interests from Western philosophy to Chinese history and archaeology, but it 
can also be applied positively to the contemporary world.  
 
Introduction 
 
This paper aims to explore the issue of modernity in Chinese philosophy in the early 20 th 
century. I have raised the issue in the paper “Wang Guowei and A Dream of Red 
Mansions” where I discuss how crucial to understand the role that Chinese sensibility 
plays in Wang Guowei’s borrowing from Schopenhauer and Nietzsche in his idea of 
tragedy (see JET 8 [2018]). The case study focused on Wang Guowei’s Hongloumeng 
Pinglun 紅樓夢評論 (Commentaries on A Dream of Red Mansions, 1904). I tried to show 
that Wang Guowei’s alienation/misunderstanding/misinterpretation of Schopenhauer and 
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his becoming close to Nietzsche was actually a double movement (backing to his own 
cultural sensibility), which shows the true face of the beginning of Chinese aesthetic 
modernity. The case study of this paper will be focusing on Wang Guowei’s criticism of 
his contemporary Gu Hongming (1857-1928)’s English translation of the classical 
Confucian text Zhongyong. Interpreting the differences between Wang Guowei and Gu 
Hongming will help us further understand the issue at hand. I would argue that at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, in the process of modernizing Chinese culture, Wang 
Guowei and Gu Hongming’s perceptions of comparative philosophy are quite a showcase. 
Wang passionately searched for new blood to refresh the old tradition, but his borrowing is 
dominated by his unconscious attachment to his own culture and a deep understanding of 
the difference between the East and the West. By contrast, Gu was educated by Western 
culture; his double movement is shown in the fact that he eventually chose to apply 
Chinese civilization to a culture he was familiar with. It is very important to revalue his 
cultural translation: on the one hand, Gu’s translation probably is just like Wang ’s 
critique--departing from the original cultural meaning. On the other hand, his cultural 
translation complicates the issue of modernization in the early 20th century China. 
I will divide this paper into two parts. In part one, I will start with a brief introduction 
of Gu Hongming and Wang Guowei, then I will discuss Wang’s criticism of Gu’s 
translation; In part II, I will offer some of my thoughts on the issue of Chinese 
philosophical modernity and cultural communication. 
 
I. Wang Guowei’s Criticism of Gu Hongming’s Translation of the Zhongyong 
 
I-1. Gu Hongming and Wang Guowei 
Gu Hongming was born in Penang, Malaysia in 1857 and studied in Scotland, Germany 
and Paris, in the fields of literature, engineering, laws. He went back to China in 1885, and 
worked for a very famous Qing reformer and high official Zhang Zhidong (1837-1909) for 
20 years. Zhang was famous for advocating “Chinese learning for fundamental principles 
and Western learning for practical application”. In 1915, Gu became a professor at Peking 
University. He lived in China until his death in 1928. 
Wang Guowei was 20 years younger than Gu Hongming. Gu had developed his 
interest in Chinese culture in his late 20’s when he was in Europe. Wang developed his 
interest in Western philosophy in his 20’s too, when he moved from his hometown in 
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Zhejiang province to Shanghai. However, his interest in Western philosophy lasted less 
than 10 years. In their later years they were both viewed as “cultural conservatives.” They 
taught at Beida and Tsinghua respectively and both wore traditional clothes and queues, 
which was symbolic in the eyes of cultural revolutionaries in the 1920’s. 
Gu’s translation of the Zhongyong was first published in Shanghai in 1906, and later 
in London in 1908. At that time, Wang Guowei was the chief philosophy editor of a 
Journal called World of Education in Shanghai. He published his criticism of Gu’s English 
translation in that journal in the very same year, 1906.  Gu had been back in China for 
above 20 year, while Wang Guowei was still passionate about Western philosophy. 
 
I-2. Wang Guowei’s Criticism of Gu Hongming 
In his (Shu Gu Tangsheng Yingyi Zhongyonghou書辜氏湯生英譯中庸后) [Comments on 
Gu Tangsheng’s English Translation of Zhongyong], 1906), Wang comments that the 
biggest problem with Gu’s translation is that it is “not faithful to the past” since he applies 
Western philosophical terms which bear no [semantic] connection at all with Zhongyong’s 
own terms…. He says, 
 
Although Zhongyong 中庸  is a philosophy which raises ‘Cheng’ (誠 ) [integrity, 
sincerity] as the essence of cosmos and life, it is still different from modern Western 
philosophy.  ‘Cheng’ as a concept is not only different from Fichte’s ‘Ego,’ Schelling’s 
‘Absolute,’ Hegel’s ‘Idea,’ Schopenhauer’s ‘Will,’ and Hartmann’s ‘Unconscious,’ but it 
is also different in interpretation and explanation.  I don’t think that borrowing the 
concepts of modern Western philosophy to interpret ancient Chinese philosophy is the 
right way to approach our ancient philosophy in its own terms.  Our ancient scholars 
were not so systematic in their writing; in one passage, they can freely talk about both 
tiandao天道 and renshi人事, the same as for a whole chapter, and they feel free to use 
one word to express all the different meanings, and to use one concept to discuss both 
tian and human beings. (Wang, 1997, 45) 
 
He chose one paragraph from Gu’s translation of Ch. 23 of the Zhongyong to show why 
the words Gu chose to translate the Zhongyong were philosophically unfit: 
 
誠則形，形則著，著則明，明則動，動則變，變則化。 
Where there is truth (誠 cheng), there is substance(形 xing). Where there is substance (形
xing), there is reality (著 zhu). Where there is reality (著 zhu), there is intelligence (明
ming). Where there is intelligence (明 ming), there is power (動 dong). Where there is 
power (動 dong), there is influence (變 bian). Where there is influence (變 bian), there is 
creation ([“creative power” in the London version] 化 hua). (Ibid, 46) 
58 JINLI HE 
 
Journal of East-West Thought 
 
 
Gu uses truth to translate the central concept of the Zhongyong, 誠 cheng, which is usually 
translated as sincerity or integrity. 形 xing (form; determinate) as substance;  
著 zhu（manifest）as reality; 明 ming（understanding）as intelligence; 動 dong 
(affected） as power; 變  bian（ change） as influence; 化  hua（ transformed） as 
creation/creative power. 
As I pointed out in “Wang Guowei and A Dream of Red Mansions”: 
 
One of the most persistent ideas in Chinese philosophy is that since there is no 
transcendent divinity in Chinese culture comparable to the Western transcendent spirit, 
the Chinese concerns for “life” are expressed and embodied in “the proper way of human 
beings” (rendao 人道 ) and concrete, familiar things in this world (renshi 人事 ).  
Concepts such as dao and tian in Chinese philosophy cannot be interpreted in the same 
way as the concepts of Idea, God, Will, and other absolute principles often found in 
Western philosophy.  Chinese philosophy concerns itself with the proper way of human 
beings even more than the way of tian; or, to put it another way, the way of tian” 
(tiandao 天道) is actually the same as the proper way of human beings (rendao 人道) and 
is not something above and beyond rendao. (He, 2018, 60) 
 
Cheng as a philosophical concept shouldn’t be understood in the way as the one behind the 
many, the truth beyond or behind things. This chapter of Zhongyong, in fact, describes the 
ongoing inter-transforming process of cultivating utmost cheng in oneself. It expresses all 
the spontaneous, continuous possibilities in this process. The metaphoric, poetic Chinese 
language expresses these inter-relational, con-consummate achievements in a holographic 
but not a systematic way. Applying Western terms such as truth, power, reality and 
influence, will misinterpret the Chinese sensibility and turn it into an effective, external, 
causal, linear power relationship. Just like Wang says in his comments: 
 
 ...[those terms are] now translated into Western metaphysical terms such as substance, 
reality, isn’t  a mistake to use Western philosophy to interpret this book 
(Zhongyong)?…there is no the term like tian in foreign language, just like no such term 
as God in our Chinese language….our Chinese  tian is not  the heavens天, not God, it 
is something in between, it is theomorphic physical reality but has the spirit of divinity.  
That is the same for the concept of xing性. (Wang, 1997, 47) 
 
Wang’s criticism is no doubt correct. Not only does it show that he is a master of his own 
culture, just as the later scholars agreed, but it also demonstrates his deep understanding of 
both Chinese and Western philosophy. This case actually could be used as an example to 
argue against the mainstream reading of Wang’s borrowing from Western philosophy—I 
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call it the “westernization” interpretation (I have argued in “Wang Guowei and A Dream of 
Red Mansions against this dominant [mis]reading). I will explain my point in more details 
later.  
Now, probably it is a little hard to understand Gu Hongming’s case. Gu is also famous 
for his language abilities and cultural sensibility. Of course, those things cannot guarantee 
that he would be a good translator. With 20 years lived in China when he translated 
Zhongyong, with his reputation as an “extreme” protector of traditional values and culture, 
[he is notorious for advocating monarchy and concubinage], was Gu’s understanding of 
Chinese culture really as inferior as Wang criticized? Or there was a hidden thought behind 
his cultural translation? 
Let us first look at the English words he chose to translate the title of Zhongyong--- 
The Conduct of Life; or, The Universal Order of Confucius. He explained: “the Chinese 
word Chong 中 means central-hence right, true, fair and square; and Yung 庸 means 
common, ordinary—hence universal. The two Chinese words therefore mean the true, fair 
and square universal standard of right; in short, the common sense of right.” (Gu, 1920, 7) 
As I mentioned above, Gu was an advocator of Chinese civilization. He claims that 
the Western civilization failed to order the society with its police and physical force, 
whereas Chinese civilization is successful in cultivating “moral force.” He argues:  
 
This force in China is not police or physical force. It is the force of the highly developed, 
law-abiding instinct of the Chinese people…It comes from a strong sense of moral 
obligation in the Chinese people. But whence do the Chinese obtain this? The answer is: 
from Chinese civilization. I say, therefore, that Chinese civilization is a wonderful 
success. (Ibid, 12) 
 
In another very popular book, The Spirit of the Chinese people (1915), Chinese civilization 
is described as a “religion of good citizenship,” (Gu, 2013b, xxv) a “power of goodness.” 
(Ibid, xxix) Gu hoped to derive from Chinese civilization a way of ordering human society. 
Having this strategy--exploring the Chinese model of “universal order, a conduct of life” 
for the world, it is not that hard to understand this seemingly strange translation: 
 
xing性 as law of our being 
dao 道 as moral law 
jiao教 (usally translated as education) as religion 
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In The Spirit of the Chinese people, Gu again provides an eloquent argument for the 
Confucian “religiousness,” he claims that  
 
The greatness of Confucianism lies even in this, that it is not a religion…the greatness of 
Confucianism is that, without being a religion, it can take the place of religion; it can 
make men do without religion. (Ibid, 16) 
 
He was so eager to provide a “remedy” for Western civilization that he composed a 
“practical” or “popular” translation rather than a philosophical translation for Western 
readers. Here, I don’t mean that he didn’t want to do a faithful translation, I believe that he 
actually believed that he was doing a faithful translation. He was so faithful to his mission 
that he failed to be faithful to translating Chinese sensibility in its own terms.  
At the end of the Preface to the Zhongyong translation, Gu stated again: 
 
In the following translation then this idea of moral obligation, which forms the basis of 
human conduct and social order in the scheme of the Chinese civilization, will be 
explicitly set forth. There is of course no “new learning” in all this, but what is better, 
there is true learning in it… The enunciation in the same form and language as it is in 
this book, written two thousand years ago, is to be found in the latest writings of the best 
and greatest thinkers of modern Europe. (Gu, 1920, 13) 
 
His “reconstructed” translation provided a pragmatic interpretation of Chinese values that, 
in his mind, were very compatible with great modern European philosophy —which is 
exactly Wang’s criticism.  
It is worth to mention that twenty years later, in 1926, only a year before he 
committed suicide in Kunming lake, Wang Guowei was a Tsinghua Professor in Classical 
studies and was the same age of Gu Hongming when Gu published his translation of the 
Zhongyong. Wang wrote a note after his comments for another publication which said “Mr. 
Gu is known for his brilliance and knowledge. This paper pointed out some small specks 
in his translation. If readers use this comment to diminish Mr. Gu’s contribution, it is 
definitely not my wish, nor was of my intention when I wrote this article twenty years ago 
either.” (Wang, 1997, 54) 
I personally believe that, by then, Wang Guowei probably understood why Gu 
Hongming gave Zhongyong such a foreign face. It was already far from his interest in 
Western philosophy and they were already both be called as cultural conservatives. 
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II. Some Thoughts on Cultural Translation, Issue of Philosophical Modernity, and New 
Internationalism 
 
II-1. Cultural Translation and the Issue of Philosophical Modernity 
This case study serves not only as a simple remind that we should conduct in situ practice 
when evaluating the process of modernization in the beginning of the 20th century. The 
“westernization” reading of modern scholars’ works is one of the typical issues. What do I 
mean by “westernization” reading? I think, this phenomenon is represented by two trends. 
One, studies on modern Chinese culture are measured by Western culture, focusing on 
whether the “borrowing” is correct/success or not; two, using “the borrowed principle and 
methodology” to argue “scientifically” for the uniqueness and superiority of Chinese 
culture or for its self-denial.  
Wang Guowei and Gu Hongming’s case in fact demonstrates two alternative 
approaches towards philosophical dialogue and cultural exchange. Wang’s approach is a 
very cultural context-sensitive one: understanding the differences and selecting what is 
needed for cultural inspiration and reformation—we could call this approach nalaizhuyi 拿
來主義 (taking-inism)—borrowing without touching the cultural essence. Gu’s approach is 
more a songchuzhuyi 送出主義 (sending-outism). It is a global-local context sensitive one: 
searching for the local’s path towards the global. Gu applies Western terms in his 
translation and suspends the cultural nuances to fit the globality. One could say, that he 
was trying to build a new internationalism with Chinese civilization. Their senses of 
“modern” have different directions and can’t be simply categorized in the main 
“westernization” generalization. A comparative perspective is needed when introducing a 
new culture in one’s own society, so one could learn to properly select without losing what 
should be cherished for the sustainable development of a long-standing culture. 
 A double movement is also needed so one could develop a healthy sense of 
contribution to the global dialogue. Wang Guowei’s passionately searching for new blood 
to refresh the old tradition is still very inspiring in many ways in contemporary Chinese 
scholarship. His borrowing from Western civilization was selective and practical, 
determined by his deeply rooted cultural sensibility. Gu was actually selling Chinese 
culture in a language that was attractive or acceptable enough to Western readers. To 
reevaluate his not very exact cultural translation can provide an opportunity to look beyond 
the “modernization complex,” deconstruct westernization “spell,” and build a new 
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internationalism. Of course, we should admit that Gu’s reconstructed cultural translation is 
very risky—it might develop an even deeper and bigger misunderstanding of one’s own 
culture and the target audience, so it eventually will end up as a false internationalism. 
Perhaps studying the intention behind this kind of translation and pointing out its value and 
damage is one way that leads to the proper path—especially after a hundred years of 
movement of modernity.  
  
II-2. Building a New Internationalism through Wang Guowei and Chinese Philosophy 
Now I would like to take a new perspective to further look at Wang Guowei’s case. In fact, 
after 1907, Wang Guowei experienced a rather dramatic academic turn. His short passion 
for xixue 西學 (Western learning) died out as his devotion to guogu 國故 (national 
cultural heritage studies) intensified. Although one could argue that his mentor, Luo 
Zhenyu 羅振玉 (1866-1940), the famous archaeologist, played an important role in this 
turn, still we should never underestimate the importance of the inner departure made by 
Wang himself. 1 As a devoted Confucian scholar, Wang’s encounter with Schopenhauer 
inevitably turned out to be a rather frustrating experience. One passage from Hongloumeng 
Pinglun 《紅樓夢評論》 (Critique of A Dream of Red Mansions) demonstrates his cultural 
stand very well. In the passage, Wang refers to Schopenhauer’s pessimistic doctrine as 
“wusheng zhuyi 無生主義” (lifeless-ism) and characterizes his own doctrine, in direct 
opposition to Schopenhauer, as “shengsheng zhuyi 生生主義” (live-life-ism). I have 
quoted it in other articles on Wang Guowei, but never had chance to explain it. I requote it 
here: 
 
One doctrine that is opposed to this (pessimistic) doctrine of lifeless-ism (wusheng zhuyi) 
is live-life-ism (shengsheng zhuyi)... Based on the ideal of live-life-ism, if we want to 
maximize the quality of life in this world, we should minimize the purview of the 
individual. The so-called “maximizing of happiness” and “benefit for the greater 
number” is only a dream of ethics... however, without this dream, our world will be ruled 
by the law of the jungle. (Wang, 1983, 58) 
 
My interpretation is that Wang’s emphasis on live-life-ism was derived from what I call 
“cultural unconscious”—the very Confucian sensibility—renjian jingshen 人間精神（the 
 
1 Yuan Yingguang, Liu Yinsheng (1996), 75-79. For the discussion of Wang Guowei’s relationship 
with Luo Zhenyu, See Luo Jizu Wang Guowei zhi Si (The Death of Wang Guowei), (1999). 
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spirit of this world) 2 that is implied by the expression of “minimizing the purview of the 
individual” and “maximizing the happiness and benefit of the greater number.” This 
cultural unconscious was so dominant in his thinking that it made Wang eventually depart 
from Schopenhauer and Western philosophy altogether.  
Interestingly, apart from the paragraph quoted above from Hongloumeng Pinglun, the 
phrase did not appear in any of Wang’s other works. Apparently, Wang had no intention of 
establishing a full-fledged theory of “living.” However, through my ongoing reading of 
Wang Guowei, I believe shengsheng zhuyi articulates his Confucian sensibility, as does the 
phrase renjian jingshen (the spirit of this world) that expresses it. Not only can it be used 
to explain the underlying reason for the essential turn in Wang’s academic interest from 
Western philosophy to Chinese philosophy, history and archaeology; it also provides a 
means to explore how the ideal of shengsheng zhuyi could be applied positively to the 
contemporary world. 
Shengsheng zhuyi—live-life-ism is not only an affirmation of this human world (as I 
tried to show in the article “Wang Guowei and A Dream of Red Mansions”), but more 
importantly, it represents the ideal of living a sustainable life in this world. In an article 
Lun Jinnian zhi Xueshujie 《论近年之学術界》 (On Contemporary Scholarship) which was 
published in 1905，Wang criticizes Kang Youwei and others because they use the “new 
learning” (namely, Western learning in Chinese eyes) to “pursue their political goals.”3 
While Wang acknowledges the importance of national independence, he believes that 
independence and strength cannot be gained by joining the world’s mainstream, which 
is—competing and fighting for survival (zheng 爭 ), using Wang’s expression in 
Hongloumeng Pinglun—“ruled by the law of the jungle.” (Wang, 1983, 58) 
Many years later in 1924, by then Wang, as a well-known Chinese historian and 
“conservative” scholar, wrote a long memorial to Emperor Pu Yi 溥儀（1906-1967), which 
is entitled as Lunzheng Xueshu 《論政學疏》 (Memorial on Politics). In that letter, Wang 
summarized the damages and harms of Western learning (xixue) to the already decaying 
Chinese civilization: 
 
Western learning is prevailing in the world. It is because nations seek after wealth and 
 
2 I have used the concept of renjian jingshen人間精神 (spirit of this world), or renjian qinghuai人間
情懷 (feelings for this world) to describe the cultural sensibility that plays role in Wang Guowei’s 
thinking. 
3 Wang Guowei (1983), 95. This article was originally published in Jiaoyu Shijie 1, no. 93 (1905). 
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strength. However, since the Great War (World War I) in Europe, all the powerful states 
in the West are in decline…having never seen a life this cruel before… Half of the reason 
for the moral decline, fights and poverty, of the last 20 years in China was caused by this 
(the New Learning)… I have been thinking of the reasons and found two: one, 
Westerners consider rights as bestowed upon people. Their politics is all about wealth 
and powerful states. Contest and competition is a natural thing to them, making progress 
is considered as a great quality…therefore, states fight with each other; the superior 
fights the inferior, the poor fights the rich…those are all derived from greed. The harm of 
Western learning comes from the fighting heart. 
 
I see the Westerners deal with things through scientific methodology. Science deals with 
space, time, materials and the bodies of humans and animals…as for human heart and 
human society, they have their own national/cultural character...cannot be ruled by 
science…Westerners only see this, but forget all the other aspects of life…this is the 
second disadvantage of Western methodology.4 
 
Wang’s frustration and disappointment with the new learning is directed against its ideal of 
individualism and its valorization of struggle, contest and competition. For him, this is the 
root of life-less-ism. His nostalgia for the culture he was immersed in—a culture for 
“human heart and human society” (in that sense, Wang Guowei and Gu Hongming share 
the same feelings towards Chinese culture)—the root of the ideal of live-life-ism, is 
expressed in his letters to some of his close friends.  
On March 14, 1919, in a letter to his mentor Luo Zhenyu, Wang wrote, “The current 
situation of the world is the consequence of the Western idea of pursuing wealth and 
strength in the last hundreds of years… If, in the future, there are still survivors, they must 
adopt Eastern values and politics.” (Wang, 1984, 285) Again, in 1920, in a letter to his 
Japanese friend, archeologist Kano Naoki (1868-1947), he wrote: “Eastern values and 
politics will prevail in this world in the future. A shallow mind just cannot see it.” (Ibid, 
311) 
Wang’s promotion of Eastern values is also expressed in one of his very influential 
historical works, Yinzhou Zhidulun 《殷周制度論》(On Yin and Zhou Systems).5 
 
4 Quoted from Yuan and Liu (1996), 420-422. There were debates about the authenticity of the 
memorial. According to Luo Jizu, Luo Zhenyu’s grandson, the memorial was indeed written by 
Wang, Luo Zhenyu’s adaptation is without the beginning and the ending (Luo Jizu, Wang Guowei zhi 
Si [The Death of Wang Guowei], 291).  
5 Wang Guowei’s Yinzhou Zhidulun 《殷周制度論》(On Yin and Zhou Systems) was included  in 
Guantang Jilin《觀堂集林》(Guantang Collection，Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1959). Guantang Jilin 
was a collection originally edited by Wang Guowei in 1922, which includes Wang’s works on ancient 
history, archaeology, Chinese graphology etc.—his contribution to guogu—cultural heritage studies. 
Guantang is Wang’s another style name. 
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Like Confucius, Wang also “follows Zhou.” (Lunyu, 3: 14) Wang uses the ideas of 
qinqin 親親（consummating intimacy [family feeling]), zunzun 尊尊（ revering the 
esteemed） and xianxian 賢賢（lifting the good） to explain the ideal practice of 
Confucian moral-political philosophy. In a letter to Luo Zhengyu, on September 13, 1917, 
he explained why he was writing Yinzhou Zhidulun: 
 
I just finished my writing on the political system of the Yin and Zhou Dynasties…It is 
about the reformation of the Shang system by the Zhou…The imperial system is derived 
from the sensibility of qinqin (consummating intimacy) tradition. Rulers, dukes and 
princes are derived from the zunzun（revering the esteemed) tradition… all the ritual 
ceremonies of the Zhou dynasty come from this system, and ruler, duke, high officials 
and common people are brought into morality by this system, making their community a 
moral one. There has never been a better political ideal. (Wang, 1984, 214) 
 
Zhou, as an agricultural society with a patriarchal clan system, emphasized blood 
relationships and used these to enhance its authority. The Zhou ruler viewed the close clan 
relationship as the important band to bond the society. Wang Guowei does not promote the 
idea that Chinese society should return to the ancient patriarchal clan system, but rather 
examines the origin of this “moral group” in order to pursue the “ideal of politics.” That is, 
through these three concepts qinqin, zunzun and xianxian, Wang perceived the 
spontaneous moral power of natural feeling, which he viewed not only as the bond that 
holds the whole of society together, but also sustains it forever. He claims: 
 
In the ancient time, the so called “guojia” 國家  (state family), is not just the crux of 
politics, it is also the crux of daode 道德... if the ruler, dukes and high official everyone 
follow one’s duty and ritual… if the upper understands the difference of male and female 
through qinqin zunzun and xianxian, the below will be regulated subsequently. This is 
called zhi 治 (governing)… this is the essence of the politics of Zhou… how could the 
sages in the ancient time have no intention to pursue one’s family’s happiness and 
wealth… but they do realize that one family’s happiness is one with ten thousand 
family’s happiness, and one and ten thousand family’s happiness is combined with its 
daode. Therefore, the one who rules long is focusing on de 德 （excellence）and min 民 
（people). (Wang, 1959, 475-476) 
 
Wang believes “the great strategy of peaceful governing of ten thousand of generations” to 
be expressed through the qinqin and zunzun system of Yin and Zhou. His confidence in the 
shengsheng（ceaselessly creative）system of Chinese moral political philosophy arises 
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exactly here, however, in a time of cultural angst, such as that when he took his own life, 
the confidence and the ideal were only destined to be a sentimental “dream” journey… 
 
Conclusion: Shengshengzhuyi: The Contribution of Chinese Philosophy? 
 
If Gu Hongming’s case represents a kind of risky songchuzhuyi and a false 
internationalism, Wang Guowei’s “journey” back might bring an opportunity to develop a 
new understanding of the culture which could be beneficial for contemporary world. One 
big difference between the cultural stands of Gu Hongming and Wang Guowei is Gu’s 
songchuzhuyi makes the native culture speak in the other’s terms, while Wang’s “journey 
back” sticks to its own terms and discovers the value of the culture. 
Wang Guowei’s double movement back into his own cultural sensibility is a process 
of affirmation of his ideal of live-life-ism. He reads Confucian moral-political philosophy 
as “ziran 自然” (natural, spontaneous) philosophy6. Confucian moral-political philosophy 
is an organic and dynamic philosophy derived from the authentic feeling of human beings. 
Wang’s fresh historical eye sees the Zhou political system as deriving from the true feeling 
for/with the people (i.e., “minyi 民彝”) (Wang, 1959, 477) which not only shows that 
Wang was eager to save the already collapsed last imperial dynasty (of course he tragically 
failed), but more importantly, to affirm that the essence of this “ziran” philosophy is not 
for contest (zheng 爭), but for a sustainable development. 
Yet, in his time of cultural angst, Wang, as a scholar searching for remedies to repair 
his culture and console himself, eventually failed. The disappointment and frustration with 
the new search for the meaning of life and nostalgia for the culture in which he was 
immersed was the main reason for him to choose death. In my opinion, Wang’s tragic 
ending only enhances the high value in which he held his culture and demonstrates 
strikingly how far the reality failed his ideal.  
Wang’s frustration with the culture of zheng (fighting, competing) and his ideal of 
returning to the “ziran culture/philosophy” on which the shengsheng zhuyi (live-life-ism) 
is based should still inspire us who live in this contemporary world. Today, we live in a 
 
6 In Wang Guowei’s article Kongzi zi Xueshuo 孔子之學說 (Confucius’s Teachings) (was first 
published on the Journal of Education World [no. 161-165] in 1907-1908) in which he discusses 
Confucian tiandao as following ziran and shengsheng生生 is its innate character. He then claims 
that “moral intention” (daode) is the ziran (nature) of human being (Wang Guowei, 1997, 110-116). 
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world that is so big and at the same time so small. We can experience the pains of others 
far from us—tsunamis and earthquakes, religious conflicts, power competition, global 
climate changes, etc. The philosophy of shensheng zhuyi, as expressed in Wang Guowei’s 
life and thinking, is needed for supporting each other and for rebuilding this one world 
with nature and one another. 
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